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ABSTRACT 
Over the past two decades, a number of companies tried and failed to create a 
business model built upon editing (or filtering) movies for at-home viewers. Re-
peatedly, these entities encountered fatal obstacles—legal, business-related, or 
otherwise—in their endeavors to do so. Copyright protections proved to be the 
most difficult obstacle for these companies, and many filtering businesses in-
fringed upon rights of reproduction, distribution, digital tampering, or first sale. 
These conflicts led to numerous litigations and legislative actions, culminating in 
the recent Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., a case that still has its effects 
playing out in courts and Congress. This article examines the copyright violations 
of past filtering endeavors and looks to find viable solutions that avoid the mis-
takes of the past, fit within copyright statutes, and offer a sustainable business 
model. Only by accomplishing all three of these tasks can any filtering service 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
December of 1939 proved to be historic for the motion picture industry.1 The 
instant classic Gone with the Wind arrived in theaters, grossing almost $200 mil-
lion domestically.2 In addition to its massive box office success, the film had an-
other impact on the film industry: the Motion Picture Production Code (which 
dictated what content was allowed in film) was altered to allow inclusion of Rhett 
Butler’s famous line, “Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn.”3 The change creat-
ed some controversy at the time,4 but the debate that it began continues to this 
day.5 
Decades later, once at-home viewing was more prevalent for movies, viewers 
again raised concerns over particular films’ content.6 With this new controversy, 
however, film audiences took matters into their own hands.7 Various businesses 
began editing out the vulgar, violent, and sexual content of these films.8 This new 
practice brought the wrath of Hollywood down upon these business owners as 
litigation mounted and filtering companies were subsequently run out of busi-
ness.9 Most of these filtering businesses failed due to copyright violations, usually 
regarding distribution rights and creations of derivative works.10 What followed 
was nearly two decades of trial, error, and failure on the part of hopeful filtering 
companies.11 It seems that despite the best efforts of these entrepreneurs, no one 
has managed to create a business model that is both effective and legal.12 
In spite of these setbacks, filtering services continue to fight for their custom-
ers’ right to watch films without content that viewers deem inappropriate.13 These 
businesses continue to persist, in part because they believe in a moral right to 
viewers’ choice, and in part because there is a profitable market for their ser-
                                                          
 1. Tim Dirks, Timeline of Greatest Film Milestones and Turning Points in Film History: The Year 
1939, AMC FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/1939-filmhistory.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 2. Id.; see also Domestic Grosses Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, BOX OFF. MOJO, 
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (adjusted for infla-
tion, Gone with the Wind grossed nearly $1.873 billion domestically). 
 3. GONE WITH THE WIND (Selznick International Pictures 1939); Brian Cronin, Did Gone With the 
Wind Use the Word “Damn” in Violation of the Motion Picture Association Production Code?, ENT. 
URB. LEGENDS REVEALED (Jan. 13, 2013, 4:18 AM), 
http://legendsrevealed.com/entertainment/2013/01/13/did-gone-with-the-wind-use-the-word-damn-in-
violation-of-the-motion-picture-association-production-code/ (“[I]n November of 1939 . . . the Code 
was actually changed!” The words “hell” and “damn” were allowed if they were “essential and re-
quired for portrayal, in proper historical context . . . or a quotation from a literary work.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Jon Cohen, Mixed Reviews for ‘Sanitized’ Movies, ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2005), 
https://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/974a1EditingHollywood.pdf. 
 6. John Hughes, Moviemakers Versus the Clean-flicks Revolt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 28, 
2002), https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0828/p09s02-cojh.html. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Parts II and III. 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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vices.14 A poll by ABC News shows that nearly 40% of respondents would be 
likely to participate in a filtering service; more than half of those affirmative re-
spondents indicated themselves as “very likely” to participate.15 Accordingly, the 
consumer market, in addition to the moral imperative seen by filtering proponents, 
drives businesses to continue trying (and failing) to create a service that avoids 
copyright violations.16 
This article investigates the failures of past models and the potential future of 
movie filtering. Particularly, as the world enters an age of digital streaming, there 
is more opportunity to create filtering software—legal or otherwise.17 The aim of 
this work is to explain the law and analyze failed business models in an effort to 
show future enterprises how to succeed in a filtering business. Parts II and III 
examine failed filtering businesses, specifically emphasizing where each went 
wrong. In Part IV, special attention is given to the most recent and prominent 
filtering dispute: the continuing battle between the parties in Disney v. VidAngel.18 
Finally, Part V proposes possible solutions to the filtering issue. There are ways in 
which a filtering company could operate within existing law; some of which may 
be achieved by existing companies, and some of which may require a new entre-
preneurial effort. By examining mistakes made in the past, the road to a filtered 
future is illuminated. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF FILTERING 
Filtering has existed in one iteration or another almost since movies became 
available for home viewing.19 Only in the past few decades has editing really tak-
en off, but it has existed in some form since the 1950s.20 A general understanding 
of filtering’s history is instructive when considering the current disputes. 
A. Early Filtering 
In some ways, movie filtering has always been very simple and very legal. 
With the creation of the Video Cassette Recorder (“VCR”) in 1956, parents and 
families have had the ability to perform two powerful editing functions: fast-
forwarding and muting.21 Despite the efficiency of these features, the practical 
reality is that such edits are only as effective as the remote-wielder is adept. More 
discouraging yet, that remote-wielder is only as adept as he or she is familiar with 
the film currently in the VCR. This first form of filtering, while simple, was insuf-
ficient for the needs of consumers. 
                                                          
 14. About VidAngel, VIDANGEL, https://www.vidangel.com/about [hereinafter About VidAngel] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018); Cohen, supra note 5. 
 15. Cohen, supra note 5. 
 16. Christine McCarroll, Morals, Movies, and the Law: Can Today’s Copyright Protect a Director’s 
Masterpiece from Bowdlerization?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 331, 354–55 (2005). 
 17. Id. at 341. 
 18. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. Sylvie Castonguay, 50 Years of the Video Cassette Recorder, WIPO MAG. (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/06/article_0003.html. 
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Formal filtering services first became attractive in the late 1990s.22 As near as 
can be determined, the first filtering service primarily dealt in editing VHS copies 
of James Cameron’s Titanic.23 This early business consisted of a Utah “mom-and-
pop video store,” called Sunset Video, which spent its time altering pre-bought 
VHS tapes.24 Reportedly, this company only provided the service; clients would 
purchase their own copy of Titanic and bring it to the video shop, which would 
then snip out the offending frames (Kate Winslet’s brief nudity) from the tape and 
return it to the client.25 It began as a small, local service, but soon grew rapidly.26 
Some reports indicated that the shop edited over 10,000 copies of the film.27 The 
service did not last long, but it made the public aware of a consumer preference 
that was thus far untapped.28 More expansive editing operations began to emerge 
within the next few years.29 
B. Airplanes and Television 
It is worth noting that edited, derivative copies of films already exist in multi-
ple mediums.30 For years, some television stations, and more notably, airlines, 
have shown edited versions of film and television productions.31 There is often a 
public sentiment that these edits are too sensitive and leave too much out, some-
times sacrificing a cohesive plot.32 However, this particular practice plays no role 
in the current discussion. Edited films shown on airplanes and television are spe-
cially contracted versions, created by the studio and film distributors themselves.33 
In accordance with specific agreements, these film studios create finished, edited 
versions and distribute them exclusively to their contractual partners.34 Copies of 
                                                          
 22. Hughes, supra note 6. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; Michael P. Glasser, Note, “To Clean or Not to Clean”: An Analysis of the Copyright and 
Trademark Issues Surrounding the Legal Battle Between Third Party Film Editors and the Film Indus-
try, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 133 n.23 (2004). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dan Kadison, H’wood: Don’t Cut – Lawsuit Could Kill Companies Selling Cleaned-up Films, 
N.Y. POST (Sept. 23, 2002, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2002/09/23/hwood-dont-cut-lawsuit-could-
kill-companies-selling-cleaned-up-films/. 
 28. Glasser, supra note 24, at 134–35. 
 29. Id. at 135. 
 30. See William Hughes, Sony to Release “Clean” Versions of its Movies for Digital Download, AV 
NEWS (June 6, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://news.avclub.com/sony-to-release-clean-versions-of-its-movies-
for-digi-1798262649. 
 31. Anthony Grant, [Bleep!] How Airlines Censor In-Flight Entertainment, POINTS GUY (Aug. 19, 
2018), https://thepointsguy.com/news/bleep-how-airlines-censor-in-flight-entertainment/. 
 32. Dave Roos, What Gets Left In, Out on In-Flight Movies Nowadays?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/what-gets-left-in-out-on-in-flight-movies-
nowadays.htm; see Jake Rossen, When Monty Python Took American Television to Court, MENTAL 
FLOSS (June 6, 2017), http://mentalfloss.com/article/501461/when-monty-python-took-american-
television-court (television network ABC aired six episodes of Monty Python’s Flying Circus, but 
edited the episodes for its audiences. The resulting edits were 22 minutes shorter than the original 
episodes, and the debacle ended in a lawsuit); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
 33. Grant, supra note 31. 
 34. Id.; see also Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D. 
Ct. 2006). 
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these studio edits are unavailable elsewhere in the market, though this may change 
to some degree in the future.35 
III. PROBLEMS OF THE PAST: WHY FILTERING’S HISTORY IS FILLED 
WITH FAILURE 
There is an adage that extolls the virtue of learning from watching others 
make mistakes: “Fools pretend that you can only gain experience at your own 
expense, but I always managed to learn at the expense of others.”36 Any effort to 
create a legal and effective business model for filtering will surely be futile with-
out a consultation of the mistakes past companies made. There are many useful 
examples to demonstrate what models do not work and what actions violate copy-
right laws.37 
A. CleanFlicks 
One of the earliest businesses to make an attempt at profitable filtering was 
CleanFlicks.38 Even though studios produced edited copies of their films,39 these 
edits were not available to the consumer market at large.40 CleanFlicks’s founder, 
Ray Lines, decided to extend clean films to the everyday consumer when he saw 
the opportunity.41 
Lines initially began by simply performing an editing service for himself and 
his friends.42 Using his own editing gear, he would alter or make imperceptible 
bits of video or audio that he deemed inappropriate.43 His practice gained more 
attention from friends, and he soon branched out by making use of the internet to 
create a nationwide rental and editing service.44 In addition to copying, renting, 
and selling edited DVDs, CleanFlicks also functioned as an editor for discs al-
ready owned by viewers; customers could mail their own copy to CleanFlicks to 
be edited and returned.45 
The process of editing DVDs is more complex than the simple snipping pro-
cedure Sunset Video performed on VHS tapes.46 The editors must first upload the 
entirety of the film into a digital format, a process which requires circumventing 
protective technologies embedded in the disc.47 Once the film is on the computer, 
                                                          
 35. Hughes, supra note 30. 
 36. BISMARCK INTIME: THE IRON CHANCELLOR IN PRIVATE LIFE 180 (Henry Hayward trans., D. 
Appleton & Co. 1890). 
 37. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 38. Glasser, supra note 24, at 130 n.11 (listing a number of other early services contemporary to 
CleanFlicks). 
 39. Roos, supra note 32. 
 40. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006). 
 41. Glasser, supra note 24, at 134. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 134–35 (CleanFlicks anticipated nearly $2 million in revenue for the 2002 fiscal year). 
 45. Id. at 135 (this early business model was similar to the one Netflix used in its early business 
years). 
 46. See Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006). 
 47. Id. (the District Court of Colorado described these protections as “a digital content scrambling 
protection system . . . designed to prevent copying.”). 
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editors use standard editing software to omit visual or audio selections.48 When 
this entire editing process is complete, the film is exported as a single file which is 
then used to burn multiple discs for rental or sale.49 
Shortly after CleanFlicks (and other companies like it) began to garner a prof-
itable business, the Director’s Guild of America (“DGA”) and a number of other 
parties threatened to bring suit to bar these editing businesses. 50  CleanFlicks 
joined with its associate companies and preemptively initiated an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment vindicating their activity and pronouncing them free of cop-
yright violation.51 The DGA and its allies brought a counterclaim against the fil-
tering companies alleging copyright violations and asserting rights of reproduc-
tion, distribution, and creation of derivative works.52 These are the very first three 
rights guaranteed exclusively to copyright holders.53 The sections below examine 
the DGA’s claim against CleanFlicks with respect to each right in turn. 
The first exclusive right the studios sought to protect was the right of repro-
duction.54 U.S. copyright law is very clear in its language: “the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords.”55 A “copy” under copyright law is any “material object[] 
. . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed.”56 The 
DGA’s rights were clear, and CleanFlicks was in violation of those rights, as the 
very nature of its business was to create and copy edited versions of feature 
films.57 The court granted summary judgment on this first count to the DGA.58 
The second claim asserted that CleanFlicks’s edits were derivative works, 
which are prohibited by copyright protections.59 Derivative works are a very broad 
category of works that essentially include any form in which a work may be “re-
cast, transformed, or adapted.”60 The court’s decision in this case hinged on the 
meaning of the word “transformative.”61 The Supreme Court has provided guid-
ance for this definition; in 1994, a work was deemed transformative if it “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”62 With this standard in mind, the District 
Court of Colorado concluded that the CleanFlicks edits did not add anything new 
by way of content or message.63 Because CleanFlicks’s work was not transforma-
tive, summary judgment on count two was denied to the DGA.64 
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Glasser, supra note 24, at 139. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 141; Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2002). 
 54. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 57. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 58. Id. at 1243. 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (the statute sets forth a lengthy list of possible formats of derivative works, 
which includes the following: “translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, mo-
tion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”). 
 61. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
 62. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 63. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
 64. Id. at 1243. 
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Third, the studios claimed that CleanFlicks violated its exclusive rights to dis-
tribution.65 The fact that the filtering businesses sold and rented edited copies of 
films is undisputed.66 Here, CleanFlicks asserted a defense by way of the first sale 
doctrine.67 The first sale doctrine effectively says that purchasers of an authorized 
copy of a work have the right to do with it what they please; in other words, it 
immunizes consumers from liability for resale (which would otherwise violate the 
right of distribution).68 However, this doctrine does not extend so far as to over-
come the exclusive right to reproduction.69 Had CleanFlicks altered their original, 
authorized copies, the first sale doctrine might have protected them, but by mak-
ing multiple of their own copies, they were then distributing unauthorized works.70 
Summary judgment on this third count was granted in favor of the DGA.71 
In summation, CleanFlicks was held to not violate the exclusive right to cre-
ate derivative works.72 However, as it interfered with rights to reproduction and 
distribution, it was held to be in violation of existing copyright law.73 The District 
Court of Colorado ordered a permanent injunction, barring CleanFlicks and its 
associates from continuing their business endeavors.74 
B. ClearPlay 
The next notable attempt at filtering was the ClearPlay DVD player.75 This 
new startup actually sold entire DVD players, not just the DVDs.76 These players 
came with a FilterStick (essentially a glorified USB with the ClearPlay logo), 
which plugged into a computer to download filters from the ClearPlay website.77 
Once those filters were downloaded, the FilterStick went into the DVD player 
along with any authorized DVD purchased or rented from an authorized dealer.78 
With everything in place, the player then edited the authorized copy of the movie 
as it played, cutting audio or omitting segments with inappropriate content.79 
                                                          
 65. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). 
 66. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
 67. Id. at 1242. 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008). 
 69. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242; Glasser, supra note 24, at 147. 
 70. Glasser, supra note 24, at 146. (it should be noted, however, that 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) may 
have still rendered CleanFlicks’s business unlawful. Under this statute, otherwise lawful distribution is 
unlawful if it is “for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage . . . by rental, lease, or 
lending.”). 
 71. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1243–44. 
 75. Sean Portnoy, Self-Censoring Upconverting DVD Player Filters Inappropriate Content, ZDNET 
(Nov. 30, 2009, 10:35 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/self-censoring-upconverting-dvd-player-
filters-inappropriate-content/. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.; see ClearPlay Blu-ray and DVD Player, CLEARPLAY, https://try.clearplay.com/blu-ray-
player/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (the newer DVD players are equipped with Blu-ray capability and 
come with Wi-Fi that eliminates the need for FilterSticks.). 
 78. McCarroll, supra note 16, at 347. 
 79. Id. 
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There were some questions regarding ClearPlay’s legality, and it was even 
included in the initial litigation against CleanFlicks.80 The studios prepared to 
bring the same claims against ClearPlay with particular emphasis on the derivative 
works claim.81 However, concerted legislative and lobbying efforts led to an in-
termediary result that changed the course of the pending lawsuit.82 
C. Enter: The Family Movie Act of 2005 
In 2005, Congress intervened, cutting some of the filtering litigation short and 
resolving a number of questions before they were fully vetted by the courts.83 The 
Family Movie Act of 2005 (“FMA”) adjusted copyright law to allow limited ex-
ceptions in which some filtering companies could exist.84 After becoming law on 
April 27, 2005, this act was codified in 17 U.S.C. § 110 as an exemption from the 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights.85 
Specifically, the FMA created a narrow exemption for technology designed to 
help edit authorized copies of films: 
[T]he following [is] not infringement[] of copyright . . . the making im-
perceptible . . . of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion 
picture . . . or the creation or provision of a computer program or other 
technology that enables such making imperceptible . . . if no fixed copy 
of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer 
program or other technology.86 
In other words, the FMA made it legal for a company (like ClearPlay, but not 
CleanFlicks) to provide technology or software to edit movies on behalf of private 
home viewers.87 It did not, however, allow for fixed or permanent copies of the 
edit to be made, much less reproduced and distributed.88 
Once the FMA passed, ClearPlay, CleanFlicks, and the remaining filtering 
businesses were once again examined by the courts.89 ClearPlay and another com-
pany, Family Shield, were severed from the action, but all accompanying claims 
were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.90 The court held that “Congress has made 
a policy decision that those who provide the technology to enable viewers to edit 
                                                          
 80. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1 (Colo. D. Ct. 
Aug. 17, 2005). 
 81. McCarroll, supra note 16, at 352–53 (interestingly, this derivative works claim was the one that 
failed against CleanFlicks. There may be a possibility that ClearPlay would have been excluded from 
the permanent injunction pronounced upon the other filtering businesses.). 
 82. Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1. 
 83. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); Clean 
Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (Colo. D. Ct. 2006). 
 84. Family Movie Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. tit. 2 (2005) (enacted). 
 85. Family Movie Act of 2005, 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (“[T]he amendment was not intended to exempt 
actions resulting in fixed copies of altered works.”). 
 89. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1 (Colo. D. Ct. 
Aug. 17, 2005). 
 90. Id. (“The technology provided by Family Shield and ClearPlay is consistent with the statutory 
definition.”). 
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films for their private viewing should not be liable to the copyright owners for 
infringing their copyright protections . . . and that removes this court’s jurisdiction 
over any further controversy.”91 CleanFlicks and its associates, however, were not 
so lucky.92 The remaining filtering companies continued their litigation, proceed-
ing with the case described above.93 
ClearPlay’s vindication has been thorough and powerful. 94  Because 
ClearPlay’s DVD players allow customers to use authorized copies of films, the 
business is not making fixed copies, nor is it reproducing or distributing existing 
copies.95 In fact, in subsequent legal battles over filtering, ClearPlay has been 
lauded as a viable, legal option for providing an effective service.96 
Despite ClearPlay’s legal vindication, the company has floundered by some 
reports.97 As the world transitioned from physical discs to streaming, ClearPlay 
made a somewhat slow and ineffective conversion.98 Aside from its Blu-ray/DVD 
players (which some argue are quickly becoming obsolete technologies), 99 
ClearPlay only managed to make the jump to compatibility with a single stream-
ing service: Google Play.100 Even this service has recently encountered trouble 
keeping up with the advances in streaming software. 101  In September 2016, 
Google altered some of its coding, which interfered with ClearPlay’s ability to 
filter new releases after that time.102 Some advocates of filtering even had suspi-
cions that this code alteration was intentionally aimed at blocking ClearPlay’s 
service.103 Despite the legality of ClearPlay’s filtering services, it has failed to 
develop a successful, long-term business model. 
IV. CURRENT DISPUTES 
Clearplay’s failure to provide a reliable filtering option left consumers search-
ing for a solution.104 Recently, however, another determined and public effort has                                                           
 91. Id. at *2. 
 92. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (“[T]he appropriate branch of government had 
the opportunity to make the policy choice now urged and rejected it.”). 
 93. Id.; see also supra Part III.A. 
 94. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (“An injunction in this case would not prevent . . . a filtering service similar to ClearPlay’s, 
and thus wouldn’t negatively impact the public interest in watching filtered content in private.”). 
 97. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16-56843), 2017 WL 774224. 
 98. Brief of Amicus Curiae Clearplay, Inc. Supporting Plaintiffs/Appellees at 14, Disney Enters., 
869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843), 2017 WL 696293 [hereinafter Clearplay Amicus Brief]. 
 99. Jess Bolluyt, Are Blu-Ray and DVD Players Already Obsolete?, CHEATSHEET (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://www.cheatsheet.com/gear-style/blu-ray-dvd-players-already-obsolete.html/. 
 100. Clearplay Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at *14. 
 101. Gene Maddaus, ClearPlay is No Longer Offering Filtered Movies to Stream, VARIETY (Feb. 7, 
2017, 3:02 PM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/clearplay-streaming-new-releases-google-
shutdown-1201980650/. 
 102. Michael Cieply, ClarPlay Confirms it Can No Longer Stream New Filtered Movies through 
Google, as Competing VidAngel Fights Injunction, DEADLINE (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:49 PM), 
https://deadline.com/2017/02/clearplay-confirms-cant-stream-new-filtered-films-through-google-
1201904160/. 
 103. Id.; see also Jeffrey Harmon, ClearPlay Streaming Has Secretly Been Shut Down Since Septem-
ber, VIDANGEL (Feb. 7, 2017), https://blog.vidangel.com/2017/02/07/breaking-clearplay-streaming-
has-secretly-been-shut-down-since-september/. 
 104. See Cohen, supra note 5. 
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been made to secure rights to filter movies.105 Perhaps there has been no effort so 
concerted as VidAngel to provide a lasting and legal filtering service, particularly 
for the streaming platform.106 
A. The Rise of VidAngel 
Initially, VidAngel attempted two unsuccessful business models for filter-
ing.107 After these failed efforts, the company settled on its primary business mod-
el (which became the model disputed in VidAngel’s legal proceedings).108 This 
new and inventive model allowed VidAngel to filter and stream movies and tele-
vision shows to users on a great number of devices.109 However, the process was 
also complex and onerous. 
For every movie that VidAngel wished to stream, the company first pur-
chased “multiple” copies of DVD and Blu-ray discs for the respective title.110 To 
keep track of each disc in supply, VidAngel assigned each a unique barcode.111 
The majority of the discs were stored in a central vault for safekeeping, but one 
DVD copy and one Blu-ray copy were ripped and uploaded to a server as the 
“master files.”112 The creation of this master file required that VidAngel bypass 
digital encryptions and security measures encoded into the disc, which are com-
monly referred to as Technological Protection Measures (“TPMs”).113 Once this 
ripped master file was safely on VidAngel’s server, the film was marked in seg-
ments and tagged for various types of inappropriate content.114 These markers 
formed the basis of the filtering service. 
The home viewer would select a film from VidAngel’s library, which they 
then purchased for $20.115 VidAngel’s business model asserted that when a cus-
tomer paid this $20, they purchased one of the uniquely coded discs in the 
VidAngel vault.116 After purchasing a disc, the customer identified which content 
they did not wish to see, and VidAngel removed segments with those correspond-
ing markers before streaming the remaining film to the viewer’s device.117 The 
                                                          
 105. See Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 106. Id. at 852. 
 107. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10–11, Disney Enters., 869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843), 2017 WL 
412299 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief] (the first of these models worked through Google’s 
Chromecast. The second was a free service through YouTube. Both needed studio permission to con-
tinue, and the studios withheld consent on both accounts). 
 108. Id. at *11. 
 109. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 854 (supported devices included “Roku, Apple TV, Smart TV, 
Amazon Fire TV, Android, Chromecast, iPad/iPhone and desktop or laptop computers.”). 
 110. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *11–12; Appellees’ Answering Brief at 7, Disney 
Enters., 869 F.3d 848 (No. 16-56843) 2017 WL 658694 [hereinafter Appellees’ Answering Brief]; 
Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853 (no official number is placed on the supply of discs VidAngel ac-
quired. All three sources cited use the word “multiple,” and VidAngel—the appellant—later uses the 
word “many.” VidAngel also specifies in its opening brief that it spends almost a third of its capital on 
discs, which totaled in over $1.2 million of disc purchases by late 2016. In reality, the supply of each 
title likely varied based on projected demand.). 
 111. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *12. 
 112. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *12. 
 117. Id. (noting that no fixed copy of the edited film is created or saved in VidAngel’s model). 
10
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss1/23
Iss. 1] Hodgson: The Fight to Filter 163 
court points out, and it is worth noting, that the stream from VidAngel originated 
from the original master file and not the actual disc “purchased” by the custom-
er.118 
After viewing the edited film, the VidAngel customer had the option (and was 
indeed encouraged) to sell back the “disc” they purchased for its purchase price 
less $1 for each day the customer had the disc “in their possession.”119 This sell-
back model effectively amounted to a $1 per day rental service.120 In fact, the 
court aptly pointed out that VidAngel advertised itself as such a rental service.121 
In this process, the disc that has technically changed ownership multiple times 
had, in actuality, remained safely in VidAngel’s vault for the duration of the 
transactions.122 
After implementing this new filtering system, VidAngel grew quickly.123 The 
accessibility of the service on multiple devices, combined with an aggressive mar-
keting campaign, led to a large influx of customers.124 Soon, VidAngel boasted 
over 100,000 monthly users.125 Unfortunately for VidAngel, however, its quick 
success would only last so long. 
B. A Fallen VidAngel 
In June of 2016, a number of film studios brought an action seeking to enjoin 
VidAngel’s streaming and filtering service.126  In their complaints, the studios 
raised a number of exclusive rights violations, citing many of the same offenses 
CleanFlicks had committed a decade or so earlier.127 Additionally, Disney and its 
associates asserted a claim for redress based on VidAngel’s circumvention of 
TPMs.128 
That December, a district court in California held that Disney was likely to 
succeed on its claims and it imposed a preliminary injunction against VidAngel.129 
VidAngel’s filtering and streaming service was prohibited from engaging in the 
essential activities of its business and was therefore effectively brought to a 
screeching halt in its quest to filter movies for viewers.130 
Seeking redress from this initial injunction, VidAngel appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.131 In August 2017, eight months after the initial injunction, VidAngel was 
                                                          
 118. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 854. 
 119. Id. (i.e., if a customer sold a film back to VidAngel immediately after purchasing and viewing it, 
the sellback price would be $19. If the customer waited until the next day, they would receive $18.). 
 120. Id. (VidAngel’s rate increases to $2 per day for high-definition titles.). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 853. 
 123. Id. at 855. 
 124. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *10. 
 125. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 855. 
 126. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (listing as plaintiffs 
a number of notable movie-making parties, including Disney, Lucasfilm, Twentieth Century Fox, and 
Warner Bros). 
 127. Id. at 969–71; Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (Colo. D. 
Ct. 2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 128. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 967; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). 
 129. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974. 
 130. Id. at 979. 
 131. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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dealt another blow as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.132 With 
the injunction still in place, the case returned to the district court, where in March 
of 2019, summary judgment was granted for the studios.133 In June of 2019, the 
case will be heard before a jury that will make a decision on the damages VidAn-
gel owes.134 
C. What Went Wrong? 
In its affirmation of the injunction against VidAngel, the Ninth Circuit spent 
much of its time discussing its standard of review and VidAngel’s defenses,135 but 
its opinion (and the opinion of the Central District of California) indicated that 
there were five main issues.136 To adequately conceive of a legal model for filter-
ing, each of these issues is addressed and analyzed below. 
i. Illegal Circumvention of TPMs 
In order for VidAngel to rip the content off of its purchased discs and onto its 
server, it necessarily had to overcome a series of TPMs that the studios and dis-
tributors placed on the discs to protect the works contained therein.137 VidAngel 
readily admitted to this circumvention, referring to it in a more ameliorative light 
as “decrypting” and asserting that, as the rightful owner of the disc, VidAngel had 
the right to do so under the fair use doctrine.138 The assertion that VidAngel cir-
cumvented TPMs was a serious accusation, and it played a large part in Clean-
Flicks’s loss in court.139 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) provides copy-
right holders with a number of specific provisions that protect their works in the 
increasingly technological world.140 In a very literal way, the DMCA brought 
copyright law into the twenty-first century. Among the protections enacted are a 
number of “criminal penalties for circumvention of copyright protection sys-
tems”141 such as the TPMs involved in the discs that store these films.142 However, 
VidAngel continued to lean on its fair use defense to combat these allegations 
under the DMCA.143 
The court held that VidAngel’s fair use defense was unsupported by facts or 
law.144 The fair use doctrine codified in the copyright statute exempts certain ac-
                                                          
 132. Id. at 867. 
 133. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., No. CV 16-04109 AB (PLAx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 
2019), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5762185-VidAngel.html. 
 134. Neal Harmon, VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon: Copyright Infringement Ruling, and Where We Go 
from Here, VIDANGEL (Mar. 8, 2019), http://blog.vidangel.com/2019/03/08/vidangel-ceo-neal-
harmon-copyright-infringement-ruling-and-where-we-go-from-here/. 
 135. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d 848. 
 136. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 137. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853. 
 138. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *20, 32; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
 139. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (2006). 
 140. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 141. Yushan Luo, Intellectual Property Crimes, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1399, 1426 (2018). 
 142. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). 
 143. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *20, 32. 
 144. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017). 
12
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss1/23
Iss. 1] Hodgson: The Fight to Filter 165 
tivities from copyright violation, including reproduction and other protections for 
particular purposes.145 Fair use protects such exemptions “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”146 In 
the statute, courts are instructed to consider factors such as the nature and purpose 
of the fair use, the amount of the original work used, and the effect of the use on 
the source material.147 VidAngel argued that its actions were exempted as a simple 
“space-shift” (or transition between formats).148 This strategy proved futile, as 
there is established precedent holding that space-shifting is only fair use when it is 
for the owner of the work alone and not the general public.149 Because VidAngel 
distributed its space-shifted copies, the fair use doctrine did not protect its busi-
ness practice.150 
After the fair use defense failed, there was little to protect VidAngel under the 
DMCA. Circumventing a TPM is a clear violation of copyright law.151 Because 
VidAngel was decrypting discs for use in a commercial business, its practice of 
overcoming TPMs was unjustified under the DMCA’s copyright protections. 
ii.  Unauthorized Reproduction and Distribution of Copy-
righted Works 
The most obvious violation by VidAngel was the outright infringement of 
two of the primary rights protected by copyright statutes.152 The law clearly states 
that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . to reproduce the cop-
yrighted work . . . [and] to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work. . . .”153 
VidAngel is without valid defense for these offenses. 
VidAngel admitted that one of its business practices was to copy the contents 
of the disc to the company’s server, a practice with precedential illegality estab-
lished over 25 years.154 By using its computers to store and edit films, VidAngel 
violated the studios’ first-listed exclusive right under current copyright law.155 
The court spent little time discussing the studios’ exclusive right to distribu-
tion.156 The very purpose of VidAngel’s business was to distribute and provide 
access to filtered movies.157 Because of the clear copyright issues in this regard, 
the courts had little need to belabor the point. 
                                                          
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *16. 
 149. A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 150. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1999) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853; see also MAI Sys. Corp., v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 
518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 155. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 156. See Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 157. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *1. 
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iii. Abuse of the First Sale Doctrine 
What little discussion the court gave regarding distribution centered on depri-
vation of profits and financial harm to the studios.158 Part of this discussion of 
harm particularly emphasized the profits VidAngel was claiming in a manner 
adverse to the studios.159 Streaming, as it turns out, is a large source of income 
that the studios rely on.160 By illegally laying claim to a significant corner of the 
streaming market, VidAngel encroached on profits that, under proper licensing, 
rightfully belonged to the studios.161 
Simple arithmetic characterizes the degree to which VidAngel’s efforts 
usurped business from the studios. On average, any one of VidAngel’s discs was 
“rented”—bought and resold—16 times in the first month of streaming through 
the platform, all the while remaining safely locked in the VidAngel vault.162 This 
means that, for every copy of the disc VidAngel purchased, the studios lost many 
times over the revenue it would have generated had each of those sales been 
through a licensed seller. This statistic only accounts for the first four weeks as 
well; sales likely continued to amass even after the end of this measurement. If 
VidAngel spent millions of dollars buying discs,163 that means that the studios lost 
millions more as a result—$15 million or more in the first month alone for every 
million VidAngel spent.164 Furthermore, the court noted that almost half of users 
would view the same titles even without filtering.165 This fact demonstrates that, 
contrary to VidAngel’s assertions, its service does not benefit the studios by “ex-
pand[ing] their market.”166 
In defending this point, VidAngel cited other rental companies, both old 
(Blockbuster) and new (Redbox).167 VidAngel argued that it had a right to engage 
in the rental business just as those other companies did.168 In return, the studios 
argued that VidAngel’s own behavior differentiated itself from these lawful rental 
companies, which relied on the first sale doctrine.169 VidAngel’s mistake in this 
analogy was twofold: (1) the first sale doctrine does not apply to works that are 
                                                          
 158. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974–77; Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 865–66. 
 159. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 976. 
 162. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *8. 
 163. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *17. 
 164. A loss of “$15 million or more” is calculated using a simple multiplier of the first-month average 
sales. For example, assume that the average DVD price is $20 (though the math is the same for any 
value). $1,000,000 ÷ $20 per copy = 50,000 copies; 50,000 copies × 16 uses in the first month = 
800,000 copies the studio might have sold; 800,000 × $20 per copy = $16,000,000 the studios will 
never see. Subtract the $1 million VidAngel initially invested to see that the studio loss is estimated at 
$15 million. Note, too, that this value estimates the loss attributed to the studios. At $1 per rental, 
VidAngel only makes $800,000 for every $15 million it causes the studios to lose. 
 165. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 861; Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *46. 
 166. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *2–3 (note, too, that even if VidAngel’s service 
expanded the studios’ market, the profits of that expansion fill the bank account of VidAngel, not the 
studios.). 
 167. Id. at *19. 
 168. Id. at *18. 
 169. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *23–24. 
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unlawfully made or reproduced,170 and (2) copyright laws do not protect rental 
companies under the fair use doctrine unless authorized by the owners of the cop-
yright.171 VidAngel was not authorized to rent films, nor was it distributing law-
fully made copies of the works in question.172 VidAngel’s own business model, in 
resorting to its buy/sell-back system, evinces that even its own administrators 
doubted the legality of their business practices.173 Otherwise, they would have had 
little reason to resort to such a technical and nuanced “rental” plan.174 
iv.  Preemptive Release in Restricted Format/Interruption 
of Windowing Strategy 
The court’s discussion of harm inflicted by VidAngel’s business continued on 
to a new practice known to the studios as “windowing.”175 Windowing is the strat-
egy by which studios “strategically release their content across different distribu-
tion channels and to different licensees over time.”176 Typically, a windowing 
strategy will gradually move from an initial release in disc or digital format to a 
wider viewing availability over streaming or broadcast networks.177 
VidAngel’s business interrupted this windowing practice by making works 
available for streaming during times of exclusive licensing or disc release.178 The 
court identified a couple of examples: Star Wars: The Force Awakens was availa-
ble for streaming on VidAngel before licensed streaming began, and The Martian 
could be streamed during an exclusive license the studios had granted to HBO.179 
These interferences by VidAngel constituted unlawful distribution of films in 
restricted formats at a time when such formats were legally unavailable.180 In this 
light, VidAngel’s business resembles piracy, something to which the Ninth Circuit 
softly alluded.181 
v. Failure to Filter Authorized Copies 
VidAngel’s strongest defense against these copyright claims was that its 
business was protected by the FMA.182 Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the 
                                                          
 170. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008) (granting fair use exemptions to “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title” (emphasis added)). 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
 172. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 173. See Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 110, at *9 (VidAngel’s CEO “called buy-sell back 
the most creative way VidAngel could come up with to offer an on-demand streaming service while 
trying to stay buttoned up legally . . . . In less euphemistic terms, buy-sellback is a lawyer-created 
construct that VidAngel uses to stream performances while feigning its customers own Discs.” (inter-
nal quotations omitted)). 
 174. Id. at *8, 11 (the studios declared this model a “sham,” and quoted both customers and VidAn-
gel’s own marketing campaign, both of which described the service as a rental platform.). 
 175. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 853. 
 178. Id. at 866. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 859. 
 182. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *19. 
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authors of the FMA agreed.183 Senator Orrin Hatch, the sponsor of the FMA, stat-
ed that he intended the FMA to be construed narrowly.184 He set out to protect a 
very specific filtering model, and, unfortunately for VidAngel, that model be-
longed to ClearPlay.185 ClearPlay, in fact, roundly condemned VidAngel’s model 
as contravening the purpose of the FMA.186 
The FMA exempted from copyright the elimination of audio or video content 
for in-home viewing (or technology that accomplished this end), so long as the 
processes created no fixed version of the altered film.187 VidAngel purported to 
comply with all of these conditions,188 but even if it did, nothing in the FMA al-
lowed filtering companies exemptions from other exclusive rights belonging to the 
copyright holders.189 
The simplest explanation of the court’s decision is that the FMA allows for 
filtering of authorized copies of a film, and VidAngel’s copies were unauthor-
ized.190 Starting with an authorized copy did not necessarily mean that VidAngel 
actually streamed an authorized copy.191 Because it was streaming an unauthor-
ized copy, VidAngel’s act of “making imperceptible” portions of films was not 
protected by the FMA. 
V. THE FUTURE OF FILTERING 
The future of movie filtering is now anyone’s game. The playing field is set, 
but no single business has truly laid claim to the market yet. Naturally, any filter-
ing hopefuls will need to fit within the copyright laws already discussed, but there 
are a number of viable options for future filtering companies. 
A. VidAngel’s New System: Will it be Enough? 
While litigation was still pending in the Ninth Circuit, VidAngel began im-
plementing a survival strategy as it continued its attempts to find a legal model for 
filtering.192 In preparation for the worst, VidAngel filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, even as it launched its new filtering system.193 With that legal safety 
                                                          
 183. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 860. 
 184. Id. at 859. 
 185. Id. at 860. 
 186. Clearplay Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at *5. 
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005). 
 188. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 107, at *19. 
 189. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (stating that “[n]othing in paragraph (11) shall be construed to imply further 
rights under section 106 of this title”); see also Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 
968 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]he FMA does not provide any exemption from the anti-circumvention 
provisions of [§] 1201 of title 17.” Recall that § 1201 prohibited circumvention of TPMs under the 
DMCA. (internal quotations omitted)). 
 190. Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 860. 
 191. See supra Parts IV.A, C. 
 192. Gene Maddaus, VidAngel Changes Course with New Netflix and Amazon Filtering Service, 
VARIETY (June 13, 2017, 6:31 PM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/vidangel-netflix-amazon-
filtering-launch-1202464295/. 
 193. Gene Maddaus, VidAngel Declares Bankruptcy to Put Copyright Fight on Hold, VARIETY (Oct. 
18, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/vidangel-bankruptcy-1202593659/. 
16
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss1/23
Iss. 1] Hodgson: The Fight to Filter 169 
net in place, VidAngel felt confident as it rolled out what it hoped would be the 
future of its business.194 
The new VidAngel model looks very different from the one the courts 
banned.195 As it restructured its service, VidAngel attempted to solve each prob-
lem the studios and the courts found with its initial model.196 Now, it seeks valida-
tion that its new structure is legal.197 
With this new system, users pay a monthly fee of $9.99 to subscribe to the 
VidAngel service.198 After that, users must also sign into a separately owned ac-
count for either Amazon or Netflix streaming services.199 With both subscriptions 
in place, the user can select any title available over either platform.200 To do so, 
viewers use the VidAngel app, which then communicates with the outside stream-
ing services.201 At that point, VidAngel serves as a middleman, intercepting the 
stream from the valid account and removing the undesired content for the viewer 
at home.202 By applying the filter over the top of a licensed stream, VidAngel 
hopes that this new service will be deemed valid.203 
As of early 2019, courts have declined to take official action in regards to the 
new model.204 VidAngel petitioned the California District Court in September 
2017 to clarify that the new service was not included in the injunction.205 The 
court denied the motion for clarification, saying only that the injunction was to 
stop engaging in practices which interfere with the studio’s copyrights.206 Howev-
er, in nearly two years since the launch of VidAngel’s new service, neither the 
court nor the studios have taken any action against VidAngel.207 This tolerance 
stands in marked contrast to the court’s swift reaction to VidAngel’s continued 
service after the original injunction.208 Two weeks after implementing the injunc-
tion, VidAngel was held in contempt and fined $10,000 for failing to cease opera-
tions of its original service.209 
Notable also in the continuing VidAngel saga is a proposed amendment to the 
FMA, which was introduced to the House of Representatives on September 13, 
                                                          
 194. Id. 
 195. Maddaus, supra note 192. 
 196. Facts Concerning VidAngel’s New Filtering Technology, VIDANGEL 2 (June 2017), 
http://blog.vidangel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fact-Sheet-VidAngels-New-Technology.pdf 
[hereinafter VIDANGEL] (pointing out the decryption, the buy-sell-back model, the windowing con-
cerns, and the exclusivity of other licenses). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Maddaus, supra note 192. 
 199. Id. 
 200. VIDANGEL, supra note 196, at 2. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., No. CV 16-04109-AB (PLAx), 2017 WL 6820015, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at *2. 
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2018.210  The proposed amendment makes little substantive change to existing 
copyright law, but VidAngel’s legislative advocates hope it will clarify existing 
law and protect its business.211 Notable portions read as follows: 
[Adding to the list of exemptions:] the making imperceptible by or at the 
direction of an individual, acting in a personal capacity, of limited por-
tions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance 
transmitted to that individual for private viewing, directly or indirectly 
from an authorized copy or digital transmission of the motion picture, or 
the provision of a service that enables such . . . [Then, clarifying that new 
paragraph:] (A) no person asserting the rights of a motion picture copy-
right owner may prevent or impede by contract the provision of a service 
as described . . . (B) no person providing an authorized digital transmis-
sion of a motion picture for any individual may modify technical aspects 
of its transmission service for the purpose of preventing such individual 
from receiving a transmission. . . .212 
Essentially, this new amendment would create three notable additions to cop-
yright law: (1) it specifically states that a company could lawfully provide a ser-
vice to omit portions of films within homes, (2) it prohibits copyright holders from 
taking any action to impede such companies, and (3) it prohibits authorized 
streaming services from interfering with such companies by altering technical 
specifications.213 
While these amendments and additions seem facially cosmetic, VidAngel 
hopes that they will be enough to clarify the validity of movie filtering in the na-
tional statute.214 This new bill would not protect VidAngel’s old system or help to 
overturn the injunction,215 but it may insulate the new model from further litiga-
tion. Notable, too, is the prohibition of licensed distributors from altering code or 
other technical aspects in order to block filtering companies.216 This inclusion is 
likely to prevent software filtering barriers such as the ones encountered by 
ClearPlay.217 
In the end, VidAngel may not even survive long enough for a final determina-
tion concerning this new technology. By filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protec-
tion, it has indicated that there is at least a possibility that the fight for filtering 
may not go well.218 And, thus far, it has not; VidAngel’s bankruptcy protection 
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was not enough to halt the pending litigation against it.219 Without that protection, 
VidAngel was found liable for copyright violation, and will face a jury trial in the 
summer of 2019 to determine damages.220 Regardless of the impending outcome, 
however, VidAngel has at least shed considerable light on some of the rights and 
wrongs of movie filtering, and maybe helped pioneer a legal path along its way. 
B. Is There a Possible Solution? 
Considering the legal battles of the past and present and the continued con-
flict of the last two decades, there are clearly a number of improper and unlawful 
ways to edit films. The questions remaining are whether there is a legal way to do 
so and, if there is, what that method looks like. Moving forward, there are four 
possible solutions for home viewers interested in filtering movies. 
The first—and possibly most obvious—solution is both simple and efficient: 
companies could simply stop trying to filter movies. This option, for whatever 
level of confrontation it avoids, is probably the least likely to occur. The public 
demonstrated that they have some level of interest in filtering services, and com-
panies like VidAngel are dedicated to offering that service.221 With the obvious 
out of the way, there remain three more likely possibilities. 
Studios do have the option of releasing the edited films they make for airlines 
and television stations.222 These copies already exist and are studio produced, so 
there would be no copyright issues with the existing statutes.223 The only barrier 
for this possibility is that the onus is entirely on the studios to come forward and 
release these copies for sale. Sony already began this sort of practice, though only 
with 24 films.224 Another drawback with this option is that, because the edits are 
already made, there is no flexibility as to what sort of content is removed. Modern 
filtering companies like ClearPlay and VidAngel allow users to select content to 
filter—a feature that would be unavailable with studio-produced edits. 
A third and increasingly plausible possibility is for the courts or Congress to 
vindicate VidAngel’s new service, and for it to increase in prevalence to the point 
of widespread use. There are still some hurdles that remain for VidAngel to sur-
vive, but it continues to fight, and even in the course of researching and drafting 
this article, the possibility of a future VidAngel service has increased.225 The two 
biggest hurdles remaining are business contracts and legal authentication. It may 
be that VidAngel winds up facing the same barriers that ClearPlay encountered: 
technological hindrance through code alterations.226 While Netflix and Amazon 
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have not outright hindered or opposed VidAngel’s use of their platforms for its 
service, neither company has endorsed nor openly supported VidAngel.227 It is 
entirely possible that either or both companies could take actions to block VidAn-
gel’s efforts. This business aspect and the legal concerns may be helped by the 
proposed amendments to the FMA.228 However, because this bill was introduced 
so late in the legislative season, it was far from passage by the time the session 
changed and the 116th Congress was sworn into office. Additionally, the bill’s 
sponsor, Mia Love, lost a tight race for re-election that may have stopped the bill 
in its tracks.229 Time alone will tell whether a new sponsor will pick up the FMA 
amendments after this transition. 
The fourth and final option is the most comprehensive, and possibly the most 
difficult to bring about. If a new business were to arise that implemented this 
fourth method, it would likely face no legal harm. VidAngel’s five primary of-
fenses were: (1) illegal circumvention of TPMs, (2) unauthorized reproduction 
and distribution of copyrighted works, (3) exceeding the scope of the first sale 
doctrine, (4) preemptive release in restricted format/interruption of windowing 
strategy, and (5) failure to filter authorized copies.230 If a new, technologically-
integrated filtering service were created, it could resolve all five of these concerns. 
Consider how a browser extension operates on an internet browser.231 It is not 
a separate application, nor is it entirely its own program.232 It is an additional fea-
ture that becomes integrated into a browser.233 In like manner, if a filtering service 
were to operate on a smart television or a background application (whether desk-
top or mobile), it could remove the current need for a separate app like VidAngel 
currently uses. The interface would be the pure, currently available streaming 
services with an editing option that overlays once a title is selected. As undesired 
content arises, the extension (likely through some combination of filtering data 
and artificial intelligence programming) would simply work as an automated re-
mote—muting or skipping any frames the user chooses to omit. 
Such a service would rectify all five of VidAngel’s mistakes. Because it 
would operate over other streaming services, there would be no need to decrypt or 
circumvent digital protections such as TPMs. In this extension-type form, the 
filtering service would have no need to either reproduce or distribute the copy-
righted works. Any questions of first sale or fair use would be moot, as the service 
would not require any sort of purchase or rental of the copyrighted work. Whereas 
VidAngel preemptively provided content in as-of-yet prohibited formats, this 
extension would only stream from the authorized platforms, therefore not interfer-
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ing with any windowing strategy the studios may have. Finally, any works edited 
by such an extension would be from authorized, licensed copies.234 
Additionally, programmers could tailor such a service to be applicable across 
more platforms because it is an extension rather than an application. Whereas 
VidAngel is now restricted to Amazon and Netflix, and ClearPlay is exclusively 
on Google Play Movies, an extension could have functionality over multiple 
streaming services.235 Users would have no need to acquire or obtain any specific 
services; they could use the same platforms they already have and use every day. 
Admittedly, this fourth option for the future of filtering may be difficult to 
create. It would require an advanced level of programing and technological exper-
tise. The artificial intelligence in question would need the ability to know exactly 
when questionable content will arise within a stream. With that foreknowledge, it 
could, regardless of which streaming platform is used, smoothly skip from the last 
frame before the questionable content to the first frame after it. That level of ex-
pertise is difficult to come by. However, despite this difficulty, it seems that such 
a model would fit most cleanly within the parameters of the FMA (amended or 
current) while also providing a simple, accessible, and sustainable business mod-
el—the step ClearPlay struggled to do.236 
One pattern discernable among the history of filtering is that the closer the fil-
tering service is to the actual filtering, the more problems there tend to be. Clean-
Flicks edited and burned its discs directly.237 ClearPlay and VidAngel both tried to 
place the actual filtering function within the home.238 The next logical step is to 
place the filtering technology directly in the home while removing the filtering 
company from the picture. Ideally, this means that this extension should be a 
product rather than a service. The less involved the company is, the more the fil-
tering is taking place in the hands and at the desires of the viewer. The FMA as 
currently enacted allows for “the creation or provision of a computer program or 
other technology that enables” filtering.239 It seems that an actual program (or 
extension) fits more cleanly within the statute than would a company like VidAn-
gel. The ideal filtering system should be a “program or other technology” rather 
than a service.240 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After two decades of trial, error, and downright failure, movie filtering com-
panies are getting closer to finding the perfect mesh of business model and legal 
propriety. CleanFlicks failed on both accounts; ClearPlay was legal, but ineffec-
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tive as a business; VidAngel violated copyright, and its future is uncertain. Of the 
existing models, VidAngel’s new service is closest to success, and time will tell if 
it is refined enough, but the ideal filtering company has yet to lay claim to this 
corner of the market. The future may see an already-existing company filling this 
need, or it may see a new player altogether, but one thing is certain: there is still 
work to do. There is a way to protect both the copyrights of the studios and the 
preferences of the viewer, and as businesses get closer to striking that balance, 
they continue chipping away at the unanswered questions in the fight for filtering. 
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